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ABSTRACT 
 
The Federal Reserve’s quantitative easing is presented as injecting $600 billion into “the 
economy.” But instead of getting banks lending to Americans again—households and 
firms—the money is going abroad, through arbitrage interest-rate speculation, currency 
speculation, and capital flight. No wonder foreign economies are protesting, as their 
currencies are being pushed up. 
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Moreover, it may well be asked whether we can take it for 
granted that a return to freedom of exchanges is really a question 
of time. Even if the reply were in the affirmative, it is safe to 
assume that after a period of freedom the regime of control will 
be restored as a result of the next economic crisis. 
         —Paul Einzig, Exchange Control (1934)
1  
 
Great structural changes in world trade and finance occur quickly—by quantum leaps, 
not by slow marginal accretions. The 1945–2010 era of relatively open trade, capital 
movements, and foreign exchange markets is being destroyed by a predatory financial 
opportunism that is breaking the world economy into two spheres: a dollar sphere in 
which central banks in Europe, Japan, and many OPEC and third world countries hold 
their reserves the form of US Treasury debt of declining foreign-exchange value; and a 
BRIC-centered sphere, led by China, India, Brazil, and Russia, reaching out to include 
Turkey and Iran, most of Asia, and major raw materials exporters that are running trade 
surpluses. 
  What is reversing trends that seemed irreversible for the past 65 years is the 
manner in which the United States has dealt with its bad-debt crisis. The Federal 
Reserve and Treasury are seeking to inflate the economy out of debt with an explosion 
of bank liquidity and credit—which means yet more debt. This is occurring largely at 
other countries’ expense, in a way that is flooding the global economy with electronic 
“keyboard” bank credit while the US balance-of-payments deficit widens and US 
official debt soars beyond any foreseeable means to pay. The dollar’s exchange rate is 
plunging, and US money managers themselves are leading a capital flight out of the 
domestic economy to buy up foreign currencies and bonds, gold, and other raw 
materials, stocks, and entire companies with cheap dollar credit. 
  This outflow from the dollar is not the kind of capital that takes the form of 
tangible investment in plant and equipment, buildings, research, and development. It 
is not a creation of assets as much as the creation of debt, and its multiplication by 
mirroring, credit insurance, default swaps, and an array of computerized forward 
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trades. The global financial system has decoupled from trade and investment, taking 
on a life of its own. 
  In fact, financial conquest is seeking today what military conquest did in times 
past: control of land and basic infrastructure, industry and mining, banking systems and 
even government finances to extract the economic surplus as interest and tollbooth-type 
economic rent charges. US officials euphemize this policy as “quantitative easing.” The 
Federal Reserve is flooding the banking system with so much liquidity that Treasury bills 
now yield less than 1% and banks can draw freely on Fed credit. Japanese banks have seen 
yen borrowing rates fall to 0.25%. 
  This policy is based on the wrong-headed idea that if the Fed provides liquidity, 
banks will take the opportunity to lend out credit at a markup, “earning their way out of 
debt”—inflating the economy in the process. And when the Fed talks about “the 
economy,” it means asset markets—above all for real estate, as some 80% of bank loans 
in the United States are mortgage loans.  
  One-third of US real estate is now reported to be in negative equity, as market 
prices have fallen behind mortgage debts. This is bad news not only for homeowners but 
also for their bankers, as the collateral for their mortgage loans does not cover the 
principal. Homeowners are walking away from their homes, and the real estate market is 
so thoroughly plagued with a decade of deception and outright criminal fraud that property 
titles themselves are losing security. And despite FBI findings that financial fraud is found 
in over three-quarters of the packaged mortgages they have examined, the Obama Justice 
Department has not sent a single bankster to jail.  
  Instead, the financial crooks have been placed in charge—and they are using their 
power over government to promote their own predatory gains, having disabled US public 
regulatory agencies and the criminal justice system to create a new kind of centrally 
planned economy in the hands of banks. As Joseph Stiglitz recently observed: 
 
In the years prior to the breaking of the bubble, the financial 
industry was engaged in predatory lending practices, deceptive 
practices. They were optimizing not in producing mortgages that 
were good for the American families but in maximizing fees and 
exploiting and predatory lending. Going and targeting the least 
educated, the Americans that were most easy to prey on.   4
  We’ve had this well documented. And there was the tip 
of the iceberg that even in those years the FBI was identifying 
fraud. When they see fraud, it’s really fraud. But beneath that 
surface, there were practices that really should have been 
outlawed if they weren’t illegal. 
  … the banks used their political power to make sure they 
could get away with this [and] … that they could continue 
engaging in these kinds of predatory behaviors. … there’s no 
principle. It’s money. It’s campaign contributions, lobbying, 
revolving door, all of those kinds of things. 
  … it’s like theft … A good example of that might be 
[former Countrywide CEO] Angelo Mozillo, who recently paid 
tens of millions of dollars in fines, a small fraction of what he 
actually earned, because he earned hundreds of millions. 
The system is designed to actually encourage that kind 
of thing, even with the fines. … we fine them, and what is the 
big lesson? Behave badly, and the government might take 5% or 
10% of what you got in your ill-gotten gains, but you’re still 
sitting home pretty with your several hundred million dollars that 
you have left over after paying fines that look very large by 
ordinary standards but look small compared to the amount that 
you've been able to cash in. 
The fine is just a cost of doing business. It’s like a 
parking fine. Sometimes you make a decision to park knowing 
that you might get a fine because going around the corner to the 
parking lot takes you too much time. 
I think we ought to go do what we did in the S&L 
[crisis] and actually put many of these guys in prison. 
Absolutely. These are not just white-collar crimes or little 
accidents. There were victims. That’s the point. There were 
victims all over the world. … the financial sector really brought 
down the global economy and if you include all of that collateral 




  This victimization of the international financial system is a consequence of the 
US Government’s attempt to bail out the banks by reinflating US real estate, stock, and 
bond markets at least to their former Bubble Economy levels. This is what US 
economic policy and even its foreign policy is now all about, including decriminalizing 
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Americans were rightfully angry that the same firms that helped 
create the economic crisis got taxpayer support to keep their 
doors open. But the program was essential to averting a second 
Great Depression, stabilizing a collapsing financial system, 
protecting the savings of Americans [or more to the point, he 
means, their indebtedness] and restoring the flow of credit that is 
the oxygen of the economy.
3  
 
Other economists might find a more fitting analogy to be carbon dioxide and 
debt pollution. “Restoring the flow of credit” is simply a euphemism for keeping the 
existing, historically high debt levels in place rather than writing them down—and 
indeed, adding yet more debt (“credit”) to enable homebuyers, stock market 
investors, and others to use yet more debt leverage to bid asset prices back up to 
rescue the banking system from the negative equity into which it has fallen. That is 
what Mr. Geithner means by “stabilizing a collapsing financial system”—bailing 
banks out of their bad loans and making all the counterparties of AIG’s fatal 
financial gambles whole at 100 cents on the dollar. 
  The Fed theorizes that if it provides nearly free liquidity in unlimited amounts, 
banks will lend it out at a markup to “reflate” the economy. The “recovery” that is 
envisioned is one of new debt creation. This would rescue the biggest and most risk-
taking banks from their negative equity, by pulling homeowners out of theirs. Housing 
prices could begin to soar again.  
  But the hoped-for new borrowing is not occurring. Instead of lending more—at 
least, lending at home—banks have been tightening their loan standards rather than 
lending more to US homeowners, consumers, and businesses since 2007. This has 
obliged debtors to start paying off the debts they earlier ran up. The US saving rate has 
risen from zero three years ago to 3% today—mainly in the form of amortization to pay 
down credit-card debt, mortgage debt, and other bank loans. 
Instead of lending domestically, banks are sending the Fed’s tsunami of credit 
abroad, flooding world currency markets with cheap US “keyboard credit.” The Fed’s 
plan is like that of the Bank of Japan after its bubble burst in 1990: the hope is that 
lending to speculators will enable banks to earn their way out of debt. So US banks are 
engaging in interest-rate arbitrage (the carry trade), currency speculation, commodity 
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speculation (driving up food and mineral prices sharply this year), and buying into 
companies in Asia and raw materials exporters. 
  By forcing up targeted currencies against the dollar, this US outflow into foreign 
exchange speculation and asset buy-outs is financial aggression. And to add insult to 
injury, Mr. Geithner is accusing China of “competitive non-appreciation.” This is a 
euphemistic term of invective for economies seeking to maintain currency stability. It 
makes about as much sense as to say “aggressive self-defense.” China’s interest, of 
course, is to avoid taking a loss on its dollar holdings and export contracts denominated 
in dollars (as valued in its own domestic renminbi). 
  Countries on the receiving end of this US financial conquest (“restoring 
stability” is how US officials characterize it) understandably are seeking to protect 
themselves. Ultimately, the only serious way to do this is to erect a wall of capital 
controls to block foreign speculators from deranging currency and financial markets.  
  Changing the international financial system is by no means easy. How much of 
alternative do countries have, Martin Wolf recently asked. “To put it crudely,” he wrote: 
 
[T]he US wants to inflate the rest of the world, while the latter is 
trying to deflate the US. The US must win, since it has infinite 
ammunition: there is no limit to the dollars the Federal Reserve 
can create. What needs to be discussed is the terms of the 
world’s surrender: the needed changes in nominal exchange rates 
and domestic policies around the world.
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  Mr. Wolf cites New York Federal Reserve chairman William C. Dudley to the 
effect that quantitative easing is primarily an attempt to deal with the mortgage crisis 
that capped a decade of bad loans and financial gambles. Economic recovery, the 
banker explained on October 1, 2010, “has been delayed because households have 
been paying down their debt—a process known as deleveraging.” In his view, the US 
economy cannot recover without a renewed debt leveraging to reinflate the housing 
market.  
  By the “US economy” and “recovery,” to be sure, Mr. Dudley means his own 
constituency—the banking system—and specifically the largest banks that gambled the 
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most on the real estate bubble of 2003–08. He acknowledges that the bubble “was fueled 
by products and practices in the financial sector that led to a rapid and unsustainable 
buildup of leverage and an underpricing of risk during this period,” and that household 
debt has risen “faster than income growth … since the 1950s.” But this debt explosion 
was justified by the “surge in home prices [that] pushed up the ratio of household net 
worth to disposable personal income to nearly 640%.” Instead of saving, most 
Americans borrowed as much as they could to buy property they expected to rise in 
price. For really the first time in history an entire population sought to get rich by 
running to debt (to buy real estate, stocks, and bonds), not by staying out of it. 
  But now that asset prices have plunged, people are left in debt. The problem is 
what to do about it. Disagreeing with critics who “argue that the decline in the household 
debt-to-income ratio must go much further before the deleveraging process can be 
complete,” or who even urge “that household debt-to-income ratios must fall back to the 
level of the 1980s,” Mr. Dudley retorts that the economy must inflate its way out of the 
debt corner into which it has painted itself. “First, low and declining inflation makes it 
harder to accomplish needed balance sheet adjustments.” In other words, credit (debt) is 
needed to bid real estate prices back up. A lower rather than higher inflation rate would 
mean “slower nominal income growth. Slower nominal income growth, in turn, means 
that less of the needed adjustment in household debt-to-income ratios will come from 
rising incomes. This puts more of the adjustment burden on paying down debt.” And it is 
debt deflation that is plaguing the economy, so the problem is how to reinflate (asset) 
prices. 
 
(1) How much would the Fed have to purchase to have a given 
impact on the level of long-term interest rates and economic 
activity, and, (2) what constraints exist in terms of limits to 
balance-sheet expansion, and what are the costs involved that 
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On October 15, 2010, Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke explained that he wanted the 
Fed to encourage inflation—his of program of quantitative easing (QE)—and 
acknowledged that this would drive down the dollar against foreign currencies. Flooding 
the US banking system with liquidity will lower interest rates, increasing the 
capitalization rate of real estate rents and corporate income. This will reinflate asset 
prices—by creating yet more debt in the process of rescuing banks from negative equity 
by pulling homeowners out of their negative equity. But internationally, this policy 
means that foreign central banks receive less than 1% on the international reserves they 
hold in Treasury securities—while US investors are making much higher returns by 
borrowing “cheap dollars” to buy Australian, Asian, and European government bonds, 
corporate securities, and speculating in foreign exchange and commodity markets. 
  Mr. Bernanke proposes to solve this problem by injecting another $1 trillion of 
liquidity over the coming year, on top of the $2 trillion in new Federal Reserve credit 
already created during 2009–10. The pretense is that bailing Wall Street banks out of 
their losses is a precondition for reviving employment and consumer spending—as if the 
giveaway to the financial sector will get the economy moving again.  
  The working assumption is that if the Fed provides liquidity, banks will lend it 
out at a markup. At least this is the dream of bank loan officers. The Fed will help 
them keep the debt overhead in place, not write it down. But as noted above, the US 
market is “loaned up.” Borrowing by homeowners, businesses, and individuals is 
shrinking. Unemployment is rising, stores are closing, and the economy is succumbing 
to debt deflation. But most serious of all, the QE II program has a number of 
consequences that Federal Reserve policymakers have not acknowledged. For one 
thing, the banks have used the Federal Reserve and Treasury bailouts and liquidity to 
increase their profits and to continue paying high salaries and bonuses. What their 
lending is inflating are asset prices, not commodity prices (or output and employment). 
And asset-price inflation is increasing the power of property over living labor and 
production, elevating the FIRE sector further over the “real” economy.  
  These problems are topped by the international repercussions that Mr. Dudley 
referred to as the “limits to balance-of-payments expansion.” Cheap electronic US 
“keyboard credit” is going abroad as banks try to earn their way out of debt by   9
financing arbitrage gambles, glutting currency markets while depreciating the US 
dollar. So the upshot of the Fed trying save the banks from negative equity is to flood 
the global economy with a glut of US dollar credit, destabilizing the global financial 
system. 
 
CAN FOREIGN ECONOMIES RESCUE THE US BANKING SYSTEM? 
 
The international economy’s role is envisioned as a deus ex machina to rescue the 
economy. Foreign countries are to serve as markets for a resurgence of US industrial 
exports (and at least arms sales are taking off to India and Saudi Arabia), and most of 
all as financial markets for US banks and speculators to make money at the expense 
of foreign central banks trying to stabilize their currencies. 
  The Fed believes that debt levels can rise and become more solvent if US 
employment increases by producing more exports. The way to achieve this is presumably 
to depreciate the dollar—the kind of “beggar-my-neighbor” policy that marked the 1930s. 
Devaluation will be achieved by flooding currency markets with dollars, providing the kind 
of zigzagging opportunities that are heaven-sent for computerized currency trading, short 
selling, and kindred financial options. 
  Such speculation is a zero-sum game. Someone must lose. If quantitative easing 
is to help US banks earn their way out of negative equity, by definition their gains must 
be at the expense of foreigners. This is what makes QE II a form of financial 
aggression. 
  This is destructive of the global currency stability that is a precondition for stable 
long-term trade relationships. Its underlying assumptions also happen to be based on 
junk economics. For starters, it assumes that international prices are based on relative 
price levels for goods and services. But only about a third of US wages are spent on 
commodities. Most is spent on payments to the finance, insurance, and real estate 
(FIRE) sector and on taxes. Housing and debt service typically absorb 40% and 15% of 
wage income respectively. FICA wage withholding for Social Security and Medicare 
taxes absorb 11%, and income and sales taxes another 15 to 20%. So before take-home 
pay is available for consumer spending on goods and services, these FIRE-sector   10
charges make the cost of living so high as to render American industrial labor 
uncompetitive in world markets. No wonder the US economy faces a chronic trade 
deficit! 
  The FIRE sector overhead has become structural, not merely a marginal 
problem. To restore its competitive industrial position, the United States would have to 
devalue by much more than the 40% that it did back in 1933. Trying to “inflate its way 
out of debt” may help bank balance sheets recover, but as long as the economy remains 
locked in debt deflation it will be unable to produce the traditional form of economic 
surplus needed for genuine recovery. A debt write-down would be preferable to the 
policy of keeping the debts on the books and distorting the US economy with inflation—
and engaging in financial aggression against foreign economies. The political problem, 
of course, is that the financial sector has taken control of US economic planning—in its 
own self-interest, not that of the economy at large. A debt write-down would threaten 
the financial sector’s creditor power over the economy.  
  So it is up to foreign economies to enable US banks to earn their way out of 
negative equity. For starters, there is the carry trade based on interest-rate arbitrage—to 
borrow at 1%, lend at a higher interest rate, and pocket the margin (after hedging the 
currency shift). Most of this financial outflow is going to China and other Asian 
countries, and to raw materials exporters. Australia, for example, has been raising its 
interest rates in order to slow its own real estate bubble. Rather than slowing speculation 
in its large cities by fiscal policy—a land tax—its central bank is operating on the 
principle that a property is worth whatever a bank will lend against it. Raising interest 
rates to the present 4.5% reduces the capitalization rate for property rents—and hence 
shrinks the supply of mortgage credit that has been bidding up Australian property prices. 
  This interest-rate policy has two unfortunate side effects for Australia—but a free 
lunch for foreign speculators. First of all, high interest rates raise the cost of borrowing 
across the board for doing business and for consumer finances. Second—even more 
important for the present discussion—high rates attract foreign “hot money” as 
speculators borrow at low interest in the United States (or Japan, for that matter) and buy 
high-yielding Australian government bonds.   11
  The effect is to increase the Australian dollar’s exchange rate, which recently has 
achieved parity with the US dollar. This upward valuation makes its industrial sector less 
competitive, and also squeezes profits in its mining sector. So on top of Australia’s rising 
raw-materials exports, its policy to counter its real estate bubble is attracting foreign 
financial inflows, providing a free ride for international arbitrageurs. Over and above 
their interest-rate arbitrage gains is the foreign-currency play—rising exchange rates in 
Australia and many Asian countries as the US dollar glut swamps the ability of central 
banks to keep their exchange rates stable.  
  This foreign-currency play is where most of the speculative action is today, as 
speculators watching these purchases have turned the currencies and bonds of other 
raw-materials exporters into speculative vehicles. This currency speculation is the most 
aggressive, predatory, and destructive aspect of US financial behavior. Its focus is now 
shifting to the major nation that has resisted US attempts to force its currency up: 
China. The potentially largest prize for US and foreign speculators would be an upward 
revaluation of its renminbi. 
  The House Ways and Means Committee recently insisted that China raise its 
exchange rate by the 20% that the Treasury and Federal Reserve have suggested. 
Suppose that China would obey this demand. This would mean a bonanza for US 
speculators. A revaluation of this magnitude would enable them to put down 1% 
equity—say, $1 million to borrow $99 million—and buy Chinese renminbi forward. The 
revaluation being demanded would produce a 2000% profit of $20 million by turning 
the $100 million bet (and just $1 million “serious money”) into $120 million. Banks can 
trade on much larger, nearly infinitely leveraged margins. 
 
CAN US BANKS CREATE ENOUGH ELECTRONIC “KEYBOARD CREDIT” 
TO BUY UP THE WHOLE WORLD? 
 
The Fed’s QE II policy poses a logical question: Why can’t US credit buy out the entire 
world economy—all the real estate, companies, and mineral rights yielding over 1%, with 
banks and their major customers pocketing the difference?   12
  Under current arrangements, the dollars being pumped into the global economy 
are recycled back into US Treasury IOUs. When foreign sellers turn over their dollar 
receipts to their banks for domestic currency, these banks turn the payment over to the 
central bank—which then faces a Hobson’s Choice: either to sell the dollars on the 
foreign exchange market (pushing up their currency against the dollar), or avoid doing 
this by buying more US Treasury securities and thus keeping the dollar payment within 
the US economy. Why can’t this go on ad infinitum?  
  What makes these speculative capital inflows so unwelcome abroad is that they 
do not contribute to tangible capital formation or employment. Their effect is simply to 
push up foreign currencies against the dollar, threatening to price exporters out of global 
markets, disrupting domestic employment as well as trade patterns. These financial 
gambles are setting today’s exchange rates, not basic production costs. 
In terms of relative rates of return, foreign central banks earn 1% on their US 
Treasury bonds, while US investors buy up the world’s assets. In effect, US diplomats 
are demanding that other nations relinquish their trade surpluses, private savings, and 
general economic surplus to US investors, creditors, bankers, speculators, arbitrageurs, 
and vulture funds in exchange for this 1% return on US dollar reserves of depreciating 
value—and indeed, in amounts already far beyond the foreseeable ability of the US 
economy to generate a balance-of-payments surplus to pay this debt to foreign 
governments.  
  The global economy is being turned into a tributary system, achieving what 
military conquest sought in times past. This turns out to be implicit in QE II. Arbitrageurs 
and speculators are swamping Asian and Third World currency markets with low-priced 
US dollar credit to make predatory trading profits at the expense of foreign central banks 
trying to stabilize their exchange rates by selling their currency for dollar-denominated 
securities—under conditions where the United States and Canada are blocking reciprocal 
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THE ROAD TO CAPITAL CONTROLS  
 
Hardly by surprise, other countries are taking defensive measures against this speculation, 
and against “free credit” takeovers using inexpensive US electronic “keyboard bank 
credit.” For the past few decades they have stabilized their exchange rates by recycling 
dollar inflows and other foreign currency buildups into US Treasury securities. The Bank 
of Japan, for instance, recently lowered its interest rate to just 0.1% in an attempt to induce 
its banks to lend back abroad the foreign exchange that is now coming in as its banks are 
being repaid on their own carry-trade loans. It also offset the repayment of past carry-trade 
loans extended by its own banks in yen by selling $60 billion of yen and buying US 
Treasury securities, of which it now owns over $1 trillion. 
  Foreign economies are now taking more active steps to shape “the market” in 
which international speculation occurs. The most modest move is to impose a 
withholding tax on interest payments to foreign investors. Just before the IMF meetings 
on October 9–10, 2010, Brazil doubled the tax on foreign investment in its government 
bond to 4%. Thailand acted along similar lines a week later. It stopped exempting foreign 
investors from having to pay the 15% interest-withholding tax on their purchases of its 
government bonds. Finance Minister Korn Chatikavinij warned that more serious 
measures are likely if “excessive” speculative inflows keep pushing up the baht. “We 
need to consider the rationality of capital inflows, whether they are for speculative 
purposes and how much they generate volatility in the baht,” he explained, but the 
currency continues to rise. 
  Such tax withholding discourages interest-rate arbitrage via the bond market, but 
leaves the foreign-currency play intact—and that is where the serious action is today. In 
the 1997 Asian Crisis, Malaysia blocked foreign purchases of its currency to prevent 
short-sellers from covering their bets by buying the ringgit at a lower price later, after 
having emptied out its central bank reserves. The blocks worked, and other countries are 
now reviewing how to impose such controls. 
  Longer-term institutional changes to more radically restructure the global 
financial system may include dual exchange rates such as were prevalent from the 1930 
through the early 1960s, one (low and stable) for trade and at least one other (usually   14
higher and more fluctuating) for capital movements. But the most decisive counter-
strategy to US QE II policy is to create a full-fledged BRIC-centered currency bloc that 
would minimize use of the dollar.  
China has negotiated currency-swap agreements with Russia, India, Turkey, and 
Nigeria. These swap agreements may require exchange-rate guarantees to make central-
bank holders “whole” if a counterpart currency depreciates. But at least initially, these 
agreements are being used for bilateral trade. This saves exporters from having to hedge 
their payments through forward purchases on global exchange markets. 
A BRIC-centered system would reverse the policy of open and unprotected 
capital markets put in place after World War II. This trend has been in the making 
since the BRIC countries met last year in Yekaterinburg, Russia, to discuss such an 
international payments system based on their own currencies rather than the dollar, 
sterling, or euro. In September, China supported a Russian proposal to start direct 
trading using the yuan and the ruble rather than pricing their trade or taking payment 
in US dollars or other foreign currencies. China then negotiated a similar deal with 
Brazil. And on the eve of the IMF meetings in Washington on Friday, October 29, 
2010, Premier Wen stopped off in Istanbul to reach agreement with Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdogan to use their own currencies in a planned tripling of Turkish-Chinese 
trade to $50 billion over the next five years, effectively excluding the dollar. 
  China cannot make its currency a world reserve currency, because it is not 
running a deficit and therefore cannot supply large sums of renminbi to other countries 
via trade. So it is negotiating currency-swap agreements with other countries, while 
using its enormous dollar reserves to buy up natural resources in Australia, Africa, and 
South America.  
  This has reversed the dynamics that led speculators to gang up and cause the 
1997 Asia crisis. At that time the great speculative play was against the “Asian Tigers.” 
Speculators swamped their markets with sell orders, emptying out the central bank 
reserves of countries that tried (in vain) to keep their exchange rates stable in the face 
of enormous US bank credit extended to George Soros and other hedge fund managers 
and the vulture funds that followed in their wake. The IMF and US banks then stepped   15
in and offered to “rescue” these economies if they agreed to sell off their best 
companies and resources to US and European buyers. 
  This was a major reason why so many countries have tried to free themselves 
from the IMF and its neoliberal austerity programs, euphemized as “stabilization” plans 
rather than the economic poison of chronic dependency and instability programs. Left 
with only Turkey as a customer by 2008, the IMF was a seemingly anachronistic 
institution whose only hope for survival lay in future crises. So that of 2009–10 proved 
to be a godsend. At least the IMF found neoliberal Latvia and Greece willing to subject 
themselves to its precepts. Today its destructive financial austerity doctrine is applied 
mainly by Europe’s “failed economies.” 
  This has changed the equation between industrial-nation creditors and third world 
debtors. Many dollar-strapped countries have been subject to repeated raids on their 
central banks—followed by IMF austerity programs that have shrunk their domestic 
markets and made them yet more dependent on imports and foreign investments, reduced 
to selling off their public infrastructure to raise the money to pay their debts. This has 
raised their cost of living and doing business, shrinking the economy all the more and 
creating new budget squeezes driving them even further into debt. But China’s long-term 
trade and investment deals—to be paid in raw materials, denominated in renminbi rather 
than dollars—are alleviating their debt pressures to the point where currency traders are 
jumping on the bandwagon, pushing up their exchange rates. The major international 
economic question today is how such national economies can achieve greater stability by 




The 1945–2010 world economic dynamic has ended and a new international system is 
emerging—one that was not anticipated as recently as just five years ago. 
  From the 1960s through 1980s, the international economy was polarizing between 
indebted raw-materials producers in Africa, Latin America, and large parts of Asia—“the 
South”—and the industrialized North, led by North America, Europe, and Japan. 
Economists analyzing this polarization focused on: (1) the terms of trade for raw materials   16
as compared to industrial goods; (2) the failure of World Bank programs to help “the 
South” cure its food dependency and other import dependency; and (3) the failure of IMF 
austerity programs to stabilize the balance of payments. The IMF-World Bank model 
promoted austerity, low wage standards, trade dependency, and deepening foreign debt. It 
was applauded as a success story in the creditor-investor nations 
  Today’s world is dividing along quite different lines. The main actor is still “the 
North,” composed of the United States and Europe. But the counterpart economic bloc 
that is emerging is growing less dependent and indebted. It is led by a rapidly growing 
China, India, Brazil, and even Russia (the BRIC countries), joined by the strongest Middle 
Eastern economies (Turkey and potentially Iran) and Asian economies such as Korea, 
Taiwan, Malaysia, and Singapore. This “BRIC bloc” and its allies are in payment surplus, 
not deficit. It is now the US and European governments that find themselves debt-ridden 
beyond their ability to pay, especially when it comes to paying foreign governments, 
central banks and bondholders. 
   Yet the world is now seeing a race to convert electronic (“paper”) credit creation 
from these already debt-ridden economies into asset ownership before governments in the 
payments-surplus economies can erect protective walls. Easy credit in the United States 
and Japan is fueling speculation in economies that are not so heavily loaded down with 
debt. This flight out of the US dollar into Asian and third world currencies is changing the 
global economy’s orientation—in such a way as to restore financial dominance to nations 
running balance-of-payments surpluses, whose currencies promise to rise (or at least 
remain stable) rather than to fall along with the dollar.  
As the US and European domestic markets shrink in response to debt deflation, 
Asian countries and raw-materials exporters from Australia to Africa have recovered 
mainly because of China’s growth. As in 1997, the problem they face is how to keep 
predatory US and allied financial speculation at bay. This makes these countries the most 
likely to find capital controls attractive, but this time around, they are trying to keep 
speculators from buying into their assets and currencies, not selling them. Targeted 
economies are ones that are strong, not ones that are weak. 
  Since the mid-19th century, central banks raised interest rates to hold their 
currencies stable when trade moved into deficit. The universal aim was to gain financial   17
reserves. In the 1930s, money and credit systems were still based on gold. Protective 
tariffs and trade subsidies aimed at running trade and balance-of-payments surpluses in 
order to gain financial reserves, but today’s problem is too much liquidity, in the form 
of keyboard bank credit that can be created without limit.  
This has turned the world of half a century ago upside-down. National 
economies in the United States, Japan, and other leading nations are lowering their rates 
to 1% or less, encouraging capital outflows rather than payments surpluses, while their 




The American economy may be viewed as a tragic drama. Its tragic flaw was planted and 
flowered in the 1980s: a combination of deregulation leading to financial fraud so deep as 
to turn the banking system into a predatory gang, while shifting the tax burden off real 
estate and the higher tax brackets onto wage earners and sales taxes. This increased the 
economy’s cost of doing business in two ways. First, taxes on employees (including 
FICA withholding for Social Security and Medicare) and on business profits increase the 
cost of doing business for American industry. 
  Second, untaxing the site value of land (and most “capital gains” are actually land-
value gains) has “freed” rental income to be pledged to banks for yet higher mortgage 
loans. This obliged new homebuyers to take on more and more debt as taxes were shifted 
off property. So homeowners working for a living did not really gain from low property 
taxes. What the tax collector relinquished ended up being paid to banks as interest on the 
loans that were bidding up housing prices, creating a real estate bubble. Meanwhile, 
governments had to make up the property-tax cuts by taxing employees and employers all 
the more. So the United States became a high-cost economy. 
  It didn’t have to be this way—and that is the tragedy of the US economy over the 
past thirty years. It was a fiscal and financial tragedy, with the tragic flaw being the 
propensity for the financial sector to engage in wholesale fraud and “junk economics.” A 
flawed tax policy was endorsed by a failure of economic thought to explain the costs 
entailed in trying to get rich by running into debt. What Alan Greenspan famously called   18
“wealth creation” during his tenure as Federal Reserve Chairman, sponsoring asset-price 
inflation turned out simply to be debt leveraging—that is, debt creation when the dust 
settled and prices fell back into negative equity territory. 
  To rescue the increasingly irresponsible financial sector from its mortgage-debt 
gambles, the United States is taking a path that is losing its international position, ending 
the long epoch of what was actually a free lunch—the US Treasury-bill standard of 
international finance. All that US diplomats can do at this point is play for time, hoping to 
prolong the existing double standard favorable to the United States and its Treasury debt a 
bit further, to permit US bankers to get just one more year of enormous bonuses in 
keeping with the American motto, “You only need to make a fortune once.” 
  What no doubt will amaze to future historians is why the rest of the US economy 
has let the banking sector get away with this! Apart from the Soviet Union’s self-
destruction in 1990–91, it is hard to find a similar blunder in economic diplomacy. It 
reflects the banking system’s success in shifting economic planning out of the hands of 
government into those of finance-sector lobbyists. 
  United States officials always have waged American foreign trade and financial 
policy in reference to their own domestic economic interests without much regard for 
foreigners. The history of US protective tariffs, dollar policy, and interest-rate policy has 
been to look only at home. Other countries have had to raise interest rates when their 
balance of trade and payments move into deficit, above all, for military adventures. The 
United States alone is immune—thanks to the legacy of the dollar being “as good as gold” 
during the decades when it was running a surplus. 
  To quote Joseph Stiglitz once again:  
 
[T]he irony is that money that was intended to rekindle the 
American economy is causing havoc all over the world. Those 
elsewhere in the world say, what the United States is trying to do 
is the twenty-first century version of ‘beggar thy neighbor’ 
policies that were part of the Great Depression: you strengthen 
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It is natural enough for the United States to shape its international policy with 
regard to its own interests, to be sure. The self-interest principle is a foundation 
assumption of political theory as it is economic logic. What is less understandable is why 
other countries have not acted more effectively in their own interests—and why US 
diplomats and economic officials should be so upset today when other nations in fact 
begin to do so. 